Factual truth

 A thought about “factual truth” as seen by R. J. Lifton (Sci. Am., May 2025).

A ripe apple is on my table. four people sitting around the table are looking at the apple. What is the likelihood that all four of these observers perceive the apple in exactly the same way? It can be easily granted that all four people see the factual truth of the apple, that is, of a round object that is cool to the touch, that has a smooth surface, that is sweet when tasted, and so on. These features of the apple will no doubt appear similar to all four observers: they are part of the factual truth of the apple—but only part of it. For every one of the observers the apple has other features perceivable only to himself: the memories of a time past, for example, when the observer shared a similar apple with someone dear to him; or whose colours recall for him past events that the other three observers could not possibly recall.  I think we should be fair and admit the impossibility of any two people's perceiving any apple in exactly the same way.  Yet Mr. Lifton would have us accept that his world, never mind an apple, is clothed in truth while the same world, as perceived by others is dressed up in lies. A thought about Ms. Harris and Mr. Walz’s own little fibs, by the way, would be a good starting point for Mr. Lifton to learn to be a little more humble.